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ABSTRACT
With more and more information being exchanged or pub-
lished on the Web or in peer-to-peer, and with the signifi-
cant growth in numbers of distributed, heterogeneous data
sources, issues like access control and data privacy are be-
coming increasingly complex and difficult to manage. Very
often, when dealing with sensitive information in such set-
tings, the specification of access control policies and their en-
forcement are no longer handled by the actual data sources,
and are (partially) delegated to third-parties. Besides prac-
tical reasons, this is the case when decisions regarding access
depend on factors which overpass the scope and knowledge
of some of the entities involved. More specifically, policies
may depend on private aspects concerning users (accessing
data) or data owners. In this case, the only solution is to
entrust some third-party authority with all the information
needed to apply access policies. However, as the policies
themselves depend on sensitive information, this outsourc-
ing raises new privacy issues, that were not present in cen-
tralized environments. In particular, information leaks may
occur during access control enforcement.
In this paper, we consider these issues and, starting from
non-conventional digital signatures, we take a first step to-
wards an implementation solution for such settings where
both data and access policies are distributed. Our approach
involves rewriting user queries into forms which are autho-
rized, and we illustrate this for both structured (relational)
and semi-structured (XML) data and queries.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.2.7 [Database
administration]: Security, integrity and protection – Access
control
General Terms: Security, Algorithms.
Keywords: access control, privacy, digital signatures, rela-
tional data, semi-structured data, XML.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy therwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
SACMAT’07, June 20-22, 2007, Sophia Antipolis, France.
Copyright 2007 ACM 978-1-59593-745-2/07/0006 ...$5.00.
1. INTRODUCTION
Access control has been studied extensively, for both re-
lational and semi-structured data, yet mostly in centralized
settings. With more and more information being exchanged
and published on the Web or in peer-to-peer, and with the
significant growth in numbers of heterogenous, distributed
data sources (such as PDAs or medical devices), issues like
access control and privacy are becoming increasingly com-
plex and difficult to manage.
Consider for instance health information [18]. By nature,
a patient record consists of many pieces owned and man-
aged by different entities (patient, referring doctor, special-
ists, hospitals, insurance company, various medical devices,
etc). Moreover, it has often a sensitive nature, since patients
clearly do not want unauthorized parties to access parts of
their medical record.
Very often, for such data that is both highly distributed
and partially confidential, the specification of access control
policies and their enforcement are no longer handled by the
actual data sources, and have to be (partially) delegated to
third-parties [1, 2, 17, 10, 24]. There are several reasons
in favor of such an approach. For example, access control
tasks may be too resource demanding for some data devices.
Also, policies may be somewhat global and not necessarily
chosen by data owners, and by delegating access control to
such trusted authorities, one does not risk to misinterpret
policies or rely on obsolete ones.
Even more importantly, decisions regarding access may
depend on various factors which could overpass the scope
and knowledge of some of the entities involved. More specif-
ically, policies may depend on private aspects concerning
both the user (who is demanding access to resources) and
the data source. In this case, the only solution is to entrust
some third-party authority with all the information needed
to apply access policies and let it handle their enforcement.
We can imagine that such authorities are at the boundary
between private domains, having access to private informa-
tion from several parties and managing access policies that
rely on this information.
However, when the policies themselves depend on sensi-
tive information, this outsourcing of access control can raise
new issues, mainly concerning privacy, that were not present
in centralized environments. More precisely, information
leaks may occur even during the initial enforcement phase,
i.e., when decisions are made about how the evaluation and
answering of the original user query are altered, and be-
fore actually returning query answers. Let us consider a
high-level example which illustrates this situation and re-
lated ideas. (This example will be detailed further on for
semi-structured data and queries.)
Example 1.1. Consider the 3-party scenario of Figure 1,
in which a user, Specialized Medical Doctor (SMD), is
demanding access to some patient information from a med-
ical record stored by a Hospital source.
Assume the initial user query asks for:
“treatment data for John Smith, either from the hospi-
tal’s regular medical records or from clinical trials which
were conducted there”.
Assume Hospital does not accept queries for patients un-
less they are first verified, properly restricted and certified by
their corresponding authority, Referring Medical Doctor
(RMD). In other words, RMD acts as an access control proxy
for incoming queries from users, modifying them so that they
access only allowed information. Let us assume that some
access rule from RMD triggers only when
• SMD performs clinical trials (which is a piece of
private information concerning SMD, not to be disclosed
to parties such as Hospital),
• the patient has some blood related diagnosis (also
a piece of private information, not to be disclosed to
parties such as SMD).
Assume that the effect of this rule will be that SMD can only
access the treatment data from regular medical records (but
not the one from clinical trial records).
In order to apply this rule, RMD must have access to these
private sensitive details from both parties. But if the rule is
triggered, and the query issued by SMD is transformed accord-
ingly, then simply disclosing to either party that the query
is not the original one but was modified (and how) reveals
private sensitive information.
Notice that we assume in the above example that access
control is implemented in a pre-processing phase, via query
rewriting, i.e., modifying the user query into an authorized
one. Indeed, this is one of the most common approaches
on controlling access and has several advantages, such as
avoiding information disclosure due to visible data manip-
ulations and exploiting existing query optimization tech-
niques. Moreover, it is particularly suited for settings where
storage and access control tasks are decoupled, since answers
can be safely returned directly to the user who issued the
query, without any additional filtering of sensitive data.
We revisit in this paper access control in a distributed set-
ting similar to the one considered in [2], where each source
may delegate to other peers some or all of the tasks of defin-
ing/enforcing access control for the data it owns. In other
words, before being evaluated at the data source, a user
query may be modified and restricted by some intermedi-
aries, denoted access control authorities (ACAs, in short).
The applied restrictions correspond to policies referring to
the particular user and data source. A query reaching the
source is valid only if certified by all the required ACAs.
Once the restricted query is evaluated at the source, the
results can be directly returned to the user. This access
control setting is illustrated in Figure 2. We refer to this
hereafter as distributed access control.
Importantly, we consider that access policies may rely on
sensitive information. The goal of this paper is to contribute
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Figure 1: A simple example scenario.
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Figure 2: Decoupling access control and resources.
to the understanding of the requirements and challenges that
are raised in this context, and to suggest a possible solution
for the privacy-preserving implementation of distributed ac-
cess control. Our solution uses cryptographic techniques,
and in particular non-conventional (homomorphic) digital
signatures.
The foremost challenge and our main focus is on prevent-
ing information leaks that may occur during query rewriting
while, at the same time, providing provenance and validity
guarantees for queries “traveling” between a user and the
targeted data source. As witnessed in Example 1, simply
disclosing to either the user, the source or other ACAs that
query transformations were performed at some step may
breach privacy. We stress that this does not mean that the
actual effect of transformations should also be hidden, but
only the fact that such operations occurred after the user
initiated the exchange.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to
address the issue of information leaks that may occur in
query rewriting-based access control in non-centralized en-
vironments. While the work presented in this paper is a
step towards enforcing access control when both data and
policies are distributed, more is needed in order to achieve
this task without breaching privacy. Other aspects, such as
the effect of collusion or the inference of private information
from query results (see, for example, [20]), are also impor-
tant. A complete study of these aspects is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Outline. We start by identifying the core issues that need
to be addressed in the context of distributed and privacy-
conscious access control, in Section 2. In Section 3, we in-
troduce auxiliary cryptographic tools, namely homomorphic
signature schemes for modifiable collections. We first illus-
trate their usage and the main ideas behind our approach
by considering relational data and select-project-join queries
with non-equalities, in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we extend
and adapt these techniques to XML data accessed in terms
of a rich family of tree pattern queries. We consider related
work and we conclude in Section 5.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We start by introducing some initial assumptions and aux-
iliary notions. We assume some familiarity with common
cryptographic notions such as public-key digital signing (for
a comprehensive study we refer the reader to [22]).
Basic assumptions. For simplicity, we assume that the
ACAs who need to be first consulted in order to access a
given source are always publicly known. We assume that
queries follow a linear path, in which each ACA is visited
once (as illustrated in Figure 2). (Indeed, this is the only
scenario which does not pose a threat to privacy.) Also, the
order in which ACAs intercept a query is not important for
the source; regardless of the path that was followed, all that
matters is which authorities are certifying it as valid. So,
when a query is initially sent, the user chooses one of the
required ACAs and redirects her query to this authority. Be-
sides the origin and target destination, we assume that each
query will carry an ID and a timestamp. Parties are assumed
to have well-known identities to which public/private keys
are associated. While ACAs are trusted to apply the access
policies they are assigned and accordingly, have access to
the (potentially private) information on which their policies
rely, they should not gain access to any other details about
users and sources.
Query rewriting-based access control. Many access
control frameworks adopt a query-level enforcement of poli-
cies [32, 31, 26, 19, 17], in which all the validity checking
is done in a pre-processing phase, before accessing data. In
this way, user queries are modified into forms which are au-
thorized (if at all possible), the modifications being aimed
at restricting the query to reveal only accessible data.
We assume a role-based approach on access control. Given
the user identity and the data item which is to be accessed,
each ACA decides to grant or deny access; once access is
denied, it cannot be granted back. Denied access translates
(if possible) into query restrictions.
Abstracting away from how policies are specified, we will
focus directly on the language-specific query restrictions that
can be applied to enforce them. According to intuition, what
is returned (explicitly or implicitly) by a restricted version
of a query should be a subset of what is returned by the
initial one. Informally, ACAs can restrict queries by either
introducing additional conditions that must be met by the
queried data, or by limiting the scope of the query output.
We say that a query is authorized by an ACA w.r.t. a cer-
tain user and source if it obeys the policies handled by that
ACA. Importantly, we assume a “monotone” semantics for
query-based access, in the sense that if a query is considered
authorized by some ACA, then a more restricted version of it
should be authorized as well. More details on query restric-
tions will be given in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, when discussing
relational and XML queries respectively.
Distributed Access Control requirements. We next
discuss the main requirements that need to be addressed in
the context of distributed privacy-preserving access control:
• Query provenance. An important aspect of distributed
access control in general is the need for provenance
guarantees. Being able to determine where an incom-
ing query originates, even if it may have been modified
along the way, is even more crucial in our case, since
access decisions are made based on the identity of the
querier. So, a first requirement is that the origin of a
query that arrives at an ACA or at the target source
must be authentic, in the sense that it should not be
possible to maliciously attribute queries to users. Ob-
viously, this is needed when choosing and enforcing
access policies, but may also be useful in tasks such as
auditing and monitoring access as well.
• Query validity. Besides provenance, a source must be
able to verify that an incoming query is authorized by
the all the required ACAs; only in this case, the query
is considered valid. Otherwise, the query is rejected.
Thus a second requirement is that false validity asser-
tions for queries should be prevented.
• No history. As illustrated in Example 1, since access
policies may depend on sensitive information, simply
disclosing how they were applied in the ACA process,
and as a consequence, how a given query was mod-
ified, may cause a privacy breach. In other words,
while intermediaries must certify that a given query is
authorized, they have to be able to hide the fact that
some query aspects do not originate at the query is-
suer. This should be hidden to the user, source or even
other authorities.
Unsurprisingly, what is particulary problematic and al-
most contradictory in this model is the need to guarantee
provenance and validity for a query, while hiding what trans-
formations occurred at ACAs.
In general, in order to authenticate a piece of information
that is exchanged, one usually needs to digitally sign it. In-
deed, this can be done by the user who issues the query, in
order to prove its provenance. Similarly, if some intermedi-
ary (ACA) intercepts a query and wants to certify that the
resulting (restricted) version is valid (as far as she is con-
cerned), she can do this by digitally signing it. However,
while digital signatures are well established techniques for
enforcing data integrity and authenticity, the common as-
sumption is that they disallow any kind of modification on
the signed message. Hence, once a query is signed by the
user or some ACA, this would prevent downstream ACAs
from further restricting it. This means that the query will
remain valid (w.r.t. the ACA who signed it) only as long
as it is not modified. In fact, what we want is for ACAs
to be able to modify an incoming query provided they only
perform restrictions. In particular, ACAs should not be able
to undo or relax previous transformations.
Supporting only partially these requirements is fairly easy.
For instance, if we accept to disclose the query changes to the
data source, the simplest way would be to take the following
high-level steps1 (see Figure 3(a)):
• the user signs her query (using some classic signing
scheme) and sends it forward to the intermediaries that
have to validate it.
• the query passes by each of those intermediaries in
turn, and each of them can add some changes (e.g.,
to a list of deltas) that are to be considered by the
destination.
• each of the intermediaries signs her changes (by any
classic signing scheme).
• when the query and its list of deltas arrive at the desti-
nation, it is immediate to check the provenance of the
initial query (still available), of the changes, and the
fact that modifications are only restricting the query.
1We omit here the straightforward cryptographic details
needed for a full-fledged, secure protocol for these tasks.
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(a) Disclosing the query modifications to other ACAs and the source
by keeping explicit deltas.
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Figure 3: Partially supporting the requirements.
Similarly, if we accept to disclose the query changes to the
user, the simplest way is by taking the following high-level
steps (see Figure 3(b)):
• the user sends her query to the intermediaries that
have to validate it.
• the query passes by each of those intermediaries in
turn, and each of them performs some changes on the
received query.
• the final restricted version follows the same path back,
and in the process is signed by each intermediary and
finally by the user.
• last, the query and all its certifications are sent to the
destination party.
Solution overview. Our solution is based on non-conven-
tional digital signing techniques, which allow some pre-defined
type of modifications over signed information. (These are
generally known as homomorphic signatures.) To guaran-
tee provenance and to enable validity, the origin will indeed
sign her queries, but in a way that allows downstream in-
termediaries to modify them, provided they only perform
restrictions. Each ACA will be able to apply restrictions
from a language-specific range, and then update the digital
signature of the query (via the mechanisms of homomorphic
signatures), reflecting these changes. Since the query sig-
nature will remain valid only as long as further restrictions
are applied, each ACA can safely put its validity certificate
on the query it sends further to the source or other ACAs.
Since homomorphic signatures do not reveal anything about
the evolution of the signed data, our approach allows ACA
authorities to enforce policies by query rewriting while being
able to hide all details about the performed modifications.
No key sharing is needed and no particular details about
potential restrictions to a given query have to be chosen or
agreed in advance by the user, source or ACAs. Importantly,
our approach is generic, in the sense that it does not depend
on how policies are specified, but only on how they are en-
forced in query rewriting. In this way, any query rewriting-
based access control model can rely on our algorithm, using
it as a black box.
The following section introduces the cryptographic tools
we will use.
3. HOMOMORPHIC SIGNATURES
While the common assumption about digital signatures is
that they disallow any kind of modification on signed data,
a more flexible approach is often needed and has been ad-
vocated lately, one in which some restricted modifications
may still occur, without invalidating the data. This is made
possible by offering signatures which are homomorphic with
respect to some operation on the message domain. Starting
from the signature(s) of some data instance(s), computed by
the data owner, anybody else can derive the signature corre-
sponding to a new data instance, if obtained only via some
accepted operation from the previous one(s). More, updated
signatures should be indistinguishable from the ones com-
puted by the data owner and this updating step should be
applicable as many times as needed.
For a given data domain Dom and signature space S , we
say that a public-key signature scheme (Signsk, V erifypk)
is homomorphic with respect to some binary operation ⊙ :
Dom2 → Dom, if there exists an efficient and public sig-
nature update algorithm Updatepk : Dom
2 × S2 → S (or
Updatepk : Dom
2 × S → S) such that
Updatepk(d1, s1, d2, [s2]) = Signsk(⊙(d1, d2))
for any pair of matching public-private keys (pk, sk) and
pairs (di, si) such that V erifypk(di, si) outputs {true}.
An important requirement is that signatures obtained via
the (secret) signing algorithm and the ones obtained via the
(public) updating algorithm should be indistinguishable (as
defined below). For such signature schemes, a forgery will
refer to a message which is not obtainable via ⊙ from al-
ready signed messages.
Insert-only and delete-only sets. Of particular inter-
est to this paper are two homomorphic set-signing schemes.
First, starting from an RSA-like scheme, [25] proposes a
public-key set-signing scheme (Signsk, V erifypk) that is ho-
momorphic with respect to both set difference and union.
More specifically, it provides two (public) updating functions
˜Updatepk and ̂Updatepk, such that:
(1) ∀U,U ′ ⊆ U, Ũpdatepk(U,Signsk(U), U
′) = Signsk(U
′)
(2) ∀U1, U2, Ûpdatepk(U1, Signsk(U1), U2, Signsk(U2)) =
Signsk(U1 ∪ U2)
Given a collection U = {a1, ..., an} and the signature
s = Signsk(U) (for some secret key sk), someone who wants
to remove elements, for instance update U to the subset U ′,
will be able to sign U ′ by using (1). The signatures obtained
by the homomorphic property are completely history inde-
pendent, because an updated signature is exactly the one
that the signing procedure would yield. It is easy to see
that we can consider this scheme as one for delete-only sets
if distinct (fresh) public-private key pairs are used each time
a collection is signed.
Second, starting from the above technique for delete-only
sets, [3] proposes the dual signature scheme, for insert-only
sets2. More precisely, this scheme provides a public-key set-
signing scheme (Signsk, V erifypk) and updating function
Updatepk, such that:
∀U, an+1 /∈ U, Updatepk(U, Signsk(U), an+1) =
Signsk(U ∪{an+1})
Given a set U = {a1, ..., an}, some new element an+1, and
the signature s = Signsk(U) (for some secret key sk), some-
one who wants to insert an+1 can do so without having to
know the private key. After insertion(s), she simply updates
the set signature. The signatures obtained by the homomor-
phic property are no longer history independent, because the
signing and updating algorithms are probabilistic. However,
they are computationally indistinguishable [22]. In particu-
lar, the order of insertions is not disclosed.
We stress that the above updating steps on the data and
its corresponding signature, for both delete-only and insert-
only sets, can be applied as many times as needed.
In practice. Consider someone who wants to publish a
collection with one-way updating, allowing everybody else
to perform the legal kind of updates. While the signing tech-
niques support this behavior, their success depends on one
aspect: the public key used to verify and update signatures.
2The main idea is to use the delete-only technique to enforce
a write-once memory (i.e., a bit vector). Adding an element
to a collection amounts to writing it in the associated bit
vector, which in turn amounts to removing some positions
from the set of free vector positions.
This key should not be modifiable, if we want to guarantee
the one-way updating. For that, the owner of the collection
has to simply sign this collection key with her (conventional)
personal public key. Of course, we assume that each party
has such a key, which is also known by everybody else. By
signing the collection key we create a “fixed point” from
which we can indeed enforce one-way updating. Someone
receiving a collection signed in this way, will only be able to
conclude that it is either the initial one or a subset (resp. a
superset) of the initial one.
4. SIGNING MODIFIABLE QUERIES
We are now ready to describe how the two homomor-
phic signatures described in the previous section can be used
to provide authenticity and validity guarantees for queries,
without revealing how/if they were modified. For simplic-
ity, low-level details of our cryptography-based approach are
omitted.
In the following sections, for relational and XML data in
turn, we will detail how queries can be signed such that
restrictions can still be performed without invalidating the
digital signature. What will be exchanged at each step be-
tween the user, ACAs and data source will be a tuple
(user, source, Q,S, timestamp, Id, certificates).
Q denotes here the actual body of the query while S de-
notes the modifiable signature of Q (which includes its cor-
responding Id and timestamp), initially computed by the
user. Certificates denotes a set of tuples
(ACAi, Si),
for Si being ACAi’s (classic) public-key signature for the
tuple
(user, source, Id, timestamp).
We stress that the query signature is initially computed by
the user and then only updated by intermediaries. Each of
them certifies Q by signing not the query body, but only its
“name”. We next detail the techniques for modifiable query
signatures.
4.1 Relational Data and Queries
We start by considering relational data and select-project-
join queries (also known as conjunctive queries) with non-
equalities (denoted CQ 6=). We then consider in Section 4.2
XML data and tree pattern queries.
We first illustrate query rewriting within this class by an
example. We will assume that queries are first normalized,
i.e., joins are made explicit (by variable equalities), with no
variable appearing twice in query terms.
Example 4.1. Consider the following MedicalRecord re-
lational schema:
patient(ssn, name, address),
visit(vID, ssn, date, wardNo, diagnosis),
treatment(tID,vID, treatment, comments),
diagnosis(name, type)
Consider the following user query Q, which asks for “Social
security number, diagnosis, treatment and other comments
for patients who were treated on 21/01/2001”:
(Q) q(S, D, T, C) : − patient(S,N, A), S = S′
visit(V, S′, “21/01/2001”, W, D),
treatment(I,V ′, T, C), V = V ′
And assume that one or several ACAs restrict Q, obtain-
ing in the end the version Q′ :
(Q′) q(S, D, T ) : − patient(S,N, A), S = S′
visit(V, S′, “21/01/2001”, W,D),
treatment(I,V ′, T, C), V = V ′
diagnosis(D′, T ′), D = D′,
T ′ 6= “bloodRelated”
Notice that two modifications occurred. First, the C-variable
was projected out of the output tuples. Second, the condition
that the diagnosis (D) is not of type bloodRelated was
introduced.
CQ6= query rewriting. The CQ 6= query restrictions
that we consider are the following:
• add new query terms.
• introduce a join either between existing terms of the
query, i.e., an equality between two variables, or be-
tween a variable and a constant.
• introduce a non-equality either between two variables
which are not already marked as equal, or between a
variable and a constant.
• remove a variable from the output.
It is straightforward to check that these transformations
will only yield more restricted queries, since the restricted
version is contained in the initial one (as a boolean query)
and the output variables of the former are among the output
variables of the latter.
Next, notice that we can describe a CQ 6= query using
several collections (concerning variables, output variables,
terms, equalities or non-equalities), as follows:
• C1, for query terms.
• C2, for variables.
• C3, for tuples (query term, variable, position).
• C4, for pairs of equal variables, or pairs of equal vari-
ables and constants.
• C5, for pairs of non-equal variables, or pairs of non-
equal variables and constants.
• C6, for output variables.
Now, assume that the user digitally signs her initial query
using homomorphic signatures for its various collections, as
follows:
• C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 as insert-only collections.
• C6 as a delete-only collection.
So, the query signature will consist of seven parts, each of
them referring to one of the collections. Obviously, these
collections can describe meaningless queries, but this is a
situation that can be easily detected and poses no security
threat.
If these steps are taken, then any ACA downstream can
perform restrictions and then update the query signature ac-
cordingly. More specifically, this means that ACAs can only
remove output nodes or introduce more conditions (terms,
equalities/inequalities). They will be able to do these trans-
formations in a persistent and confidential manner, while
modifications that do not further restrict the query are not
possible.
Example 4.2. Revisiting Example 4.1, the restrictions can
be seen as: (a) removing the C-variable from collection C6,
(b) adding the diagnosis term and its variables to C1, C2
and C3 respectively, (c) adding the equality D = D′ to C4
and (d) adding the non-equality T ′ 6= “bloodRelated” to C5.
We note that for the CQ 6= query language, delete-only
sets play a lesser role in our signing approach, and in fact
we could rely completely on insert-only ones (although with
higher computation cost). However, delete-only sets should
become necessary in more expressive SQL-style queries, for
example in the presence of disjunction. We omit further
details.
4.2 XML Data and Queries
We now employ similar ideas for XML data, the de facto
standard for data exchange. In short, an XML document
contains nested labeled elements and text, and can be viewed
as a rooted, unranked tree with labeled element nodes and
text (or data value) nodes. Figure 4 illustrates an XML
document and its corresponding tree representation. For
simplicity, we ignore other aspects such as attributes, idrefs
or ordering among siblings (more details about XML can be
found in [33]). XML data is often associated with schema
information (such as DTDs or XSchema) which describes
the possible structure of documents. For exemplification,
we adopt here the Document Type Definition (in short,
DTD) of [19], illustrated in Figure 5, which specifies the
structure of medical records. This DTD says that a hos-
pital contains records which are either immediate children
of a medicaRecords node or are found below intermediary
clinicalTrial nodes (denoting records from medical tri-
als). A patient record contains various information such as
treatment and diagnosis. Some of the fields of the patient
record are considered optional (denoted by the ? annota-
tion). In particular, the document fragment of Figure 4
conforms to this specification.
XML queries. The XML query language that we con-
sider here is essentially an extension of the most commonly
used XPath fragment (namely XPath{/,[],//,∗}) with (a)
multiple output nodes and (b) negated patterns. By / we
denote child axis navigation, by // we denote descendant
axis navigation, and ∗ denotes the wildcard label, which
matches any node label. We represent such queries by pat-
terns, as illustrated in Figures 6(a) and 6(b). Edges can be
positive (representing branches that must be matched) or
negative (the sub-pattern starting at a negative edge must
not match). Moreover, two kinds of output nodes can be
specified: nodes which are returned without their corre-
sponding subtree in the document (denoted simple-output
<hospital>
<medicalRecords>
<patient>
<name>”Jane S.”</name> 
<wardNo>555</wardNo>
<treatment>…</treatment> 
</patient>
<patient>
<name>”John S.”</name> 
<wardNo>134</wardNo>
<treatment>…</treatment>
<diagnosis>…</diagnosis>
</patient>
</medicalRecords>
</hospital>
hospital
medicalRecords
name treatmentwardNo
patient
“Jane S.”    “555”
name treatmentwardNo
patient
“John S.”“134”… …
diagnosis
…
Figure 4: An XML document and its tree representation.
hospital
medicalRecords
clinicalTrial
name treatment? date? diagnosis?wardNo
patient
Figure 5: A DTD for medical records.
nodes) and nodes for which we return their entire subtree
(denoted subtree-output nodes). Nodes which are not re-
turned by the query are called non-output nodes.
We use the following graphical representation: simple ed-
ges denote child axis, double edges denote descendant axis,
simple-output nodes are marked by an s annotation and
subtree-output nodes are marked by a t annotation. Neg-
ative edges are annotated by ¬. The nodes with positive
(resp. negative) incoming edges are also called positive
(resp. negative) nodes. Obviously, output nodes can only
occur in the positive parts of the query. Finally, all the edges
/ nodes below a negative edge are assumed negative.
Classically, the semantics of a query is the following: on
the document tree, we match all the query’s positive edges,
we check that negative patterns cannot be matched, and the
result is the tuple containing the simple-output nodes and
the subtrees rooted at subtree-output nodes. We omit here
formal definitions of the language and its semantics (see, for
example, [29] and [5]). An example of a query and its result
over the previous document fragment are given in Figure 6.
XML query rewriting. We assume the following range
of modifications that restrict a query:
(a) add anything below a subtree-output node (i.e., positive
sub-patters, output nodes and negative sub-patterns).
(b) add a positive edge below a positive edge.
(c) add a negative sub-pattern below a positive edge.
(d) remove the s annotation of a simple-output node (i.e.,
turning a simple-output node into a non-output one).
(e) transform the t annotation of a subtree-output node
into an s annotation (i.e., the subtree rooted at that
node is no longer returned).
(f) expand a positive descendant edge into a more detailed
(hence less general) linear path.
(g) turn a wildcard label of a positive node into a concrete
label.
For instance, the query in Figure 6(b) is a restricted ver-
sion (after applying some of these transformations) of the
one in Figure 6(a). Let us now rephrase the scenario of
Example 1 in XML terms:
Example 4.3. Let us assume that the initial query (Q)
from the user (SMD) asks for the medical data of patient John
Smith, including (by the descendant axis) that coming from
clinical trials (Figure 6(a)). All the data below patient
elements is to be returned.
Next, this query is restricted by the ACA (RMD) into Q′
(Figure 6(b)), which has the following differences:
• it does not access the clinicalTrial parts of the record
(the descendant axis is transformed into a child one)
• it limits the returned data to treatment information
• and it excludes bloodRelated diagnosis from the query
result
For instance, one of the policies that guided the ACA peer
in applying these transformations could be the following:
“Physicians who perform clinical trials cannot access
clinical trials of patients with blood related diagno-
sis.”
We can easily see that if the query modifications would be
known to SMD or the Hospital, private information would be
disclosed. From Q′ alone, the Hospital cannot understand
how the initial query was modified, and from the potential
hospital
medicalRecords
namewardNo
patient t
“John S.”              
diagnosis
hospital
medicalRecords
name treatment twardNo
patient
“John S.” 
¬
diagnosis 
“bloodRelated”
<patient>
<name>”John S.”</name> 
<wardNo>134</wardNo>
<treatment>…</treatment>
<diagnosis>…</diagnosis> 
</patient>
(a) The initial query (Q) (b) The restricted query (Q’)
Figure 6: A tree pattern query, its results, and a restricted version of this query.
answers, the SMD peer cannot conclude that there were some
clinical trials for that particular patient, or some blood
related diagnosis information.
We next consider how such restrictions can be handled
by modifiable signatures. Similar to the case of relational
queries, we need to encode a query into various sets over
which we enforce either delete-only or insert-only limita-
tions. While this kind of encoding was straightforward for
conjunctive queries, more work is need in the case of tree
pattern queries. To this end, we first show how a model of
trees with modification restrictions, namely annotated trees,
can be handled. Then, we show how queries can be trans-
lated into this model.
Annotated trees. We extend the delete-only/insert-
only notions to trees with nodes annotated by + and/or
−, saying that insertions or deletions of children nodes may
be prohibited (hereafter called annotated trees). More pre-
cisely, we consider that node labels are combined with an
annotation from +, −, or both (i.e., immutable, noted ⊤).
For each node, its annotation will indicate the disallowed
transformations on its children set. Intuitively, − (delete-
only) for a node indicates that one cannot insert new sub-
trees as children; + (insert-only) that the deletion of existing
children subtrees is not allowed. The absence of annotations
indicates the absence of constraints. (An obvious “sound-
ness” rule is that below a unconstrained node everything else
is unconstrained.) Besides the tree modifications given by
annotations, we also allow for type changes that are further
restricting modifications, i.e., adding a new sign.
Next, starting from insert-only and delete-only signatures
for sets, we design a signing approach for annotated trees
such that one can perform allowed modifications on a signed
annotated tree without affecting the authenticity of the tree
(i.e., the signature can be updated accordingly) and without
revealing the actual modifications. The details of this sign-
ing approach are technical but not difficult and are deferred
to the Appendix. A similar approach can be employed, for
instance, to +/- annotated DAGs.
Encoding queries by annotated trees. The above
model takes us one step closer to tree patterns, since queries
and the possible restrictions specified for this language can
be exactly captured by such annotated trees. We next illus-
trate the basic steps needed to encode tree pattern queries
by annotated trees.
Let us ignore for now descendant edges and wildcard. Fig-
ure 7 illustrates how the core blocks of queries can be mod-
eled as a combinations of annotated nodes.
Output properties. Since the output type of a positive
node can be modified from subtree-output to simple-output
and from there to non-output, we associate to each node
an insert-only list in which the reserved labels t, s and n
can be added. The labels denote subtree-output, simple-
output and non-output nodes respectively. The “weakest”
label present in the list will denote the output type.
Subtree-output nodes. In Figure 7(a), we illustrate how
a subtree-output node can be represented by an immutable
node with four intermediary children. Let L denote the list
of output nodes which are children of n, T1 denote the pos-
itive patterns below n and T2 denote the negative patterns
below n.
The first three intermediary nodes in the corresponding
annotated tree capture these three components (indicated
by the out, pos, and neg indices respectively). The fourth
annotated node, type, denotes the output kind. The node
for positive patterns and the one for negative patterns are
annotated insert-only (more positive or negative edges may
be added), while the one for output nodes is not annotated
(for now, output nodes of either type can be both inserted
and removed from this list of leaf nodes). Note that output
nodes appear both in the insert-only node pos, together with
their sub-patterns, and in the unconstrained node out, as
simple leaves.
Simple-output nodes. The case of simple-output nodes is
similar (Figure 7(b)). Transforming a subtree-output node
into a simple-output one (i.e., moving from Figure 7(a) to
Figure 7(b)) amounts to modifying the type of the one un-
constrained node (out) into delete-only. After this, it is no
longer possible to add new output nodes (only non-output
ones can still be added), yet removing existing ones can still
be done.
Negative nodes. Negative parts are easier then the positive
ones, since no modifications are allowed on them. Hence,
negative nodes will all be immutable. No intermediary an-
notated nodes are needed.
a
out
a t
T1 T2
{L}
neg+
⊤
pos+  
¬
t
type+  T1 T2
(a) Subtree-output node
a
out-
a s
T1 T2
{L}
neg+
⊤
pos+  
¬
t
type+  T1 T2
s
(b) Simple-output node
Figure 7: Translating queries into annotated trees
Wildcard. This can be easily supported by an overall
insert-only list which keeps node/label associations. A node
can appear at most once in this list, and one which is not in
the list is assumed labeled by wildcard.
Descendant axis. Regarding descendant axis, we need to
capture the fact that a //-edge can be transformed into any
(more refined) linear path. We can support such transfor-
mations as follows:
• for each pair of nodes na, nd such that na is an an-
cestor of nd, nd will be among the children of na in
the annotated tree (i.e., in the pos and eventually out
branches). This means that the annotated tree will
degenerate in a DAG. By default, all the edges will
now be considered //-edges.
• when we want to express a /-edge or transform a //-
edge into a /-edge, we can for instance insert the (par-
ent, child) pair in an insert-only list for the entire tree.
• when a //-edge is expanded, for instance into a longer
path, new descendants/ancestors will appear for some
of the nodes. This will have to be reflected in their
corresponding annotated nodes.
Finally, we stress that we are concerned only with valid
query instances; so we ignore transformations that would
result in meaningless queries which can be easily detected
by analyzing the encoding. We conclude this section by
noting that richer query features, such as joins, disjunction
or optional edges, may be controlled similarly.
5. CONCLUSION AND RELATED WORK
We considered in this paper the privacy issues which are
raised in distributed access control. When access policies
are distributed and may depend on private details concern-
ing the various actors involved, previous approaches fail to
protect privacy. In particular, information leaks may occur
during access control enforcement. Starting from homomor-
phic set-signing techniques, we suggested a possible imple-
mentation for both relational and semi-structured data. We
focused primarily on techniques for digitally signing modifi-
able user queries. Future work includes the implementation
and experimental evaluation of these techniques. Crypto-
graphic signatures for sets may also prove useful in a post-
query processing phase, for instance when filtering private
data from answers. This is the subject of future research.
Privacy in access control has been mainly studied from a
different angle, in which the user may not want to disclose
her identity and her queries to the source. This is the case
in private information retrieval [28, 12] and in the database-
as-service paradigm [23, 16]. A good introduction to access
control models for XML and tree-like data can be found
in [21]. So far, most approaches on XML access control,
such as [6, 15], consider a setting where information and ac-
cess management are highly centralized. While they offer
great flexibility in terms of the definition and the enforce-
ment of access rules, they do not provide means to handle
non-centralized access policies and multi-party enforcement.
Many works (e.g., [19, 11]) considered query rewriting as a
solution for enforcing access control over XML data. Also,
the secure exchange of modifiable information has been con-
sidered before. In [9], the authors introduce a framework for
signing XML documents that have also predefined extrac-
tion operations. Anyone can filter out information, being
able to derive a signature for selected parts of the document
(by blinding the rest). Frameworks for secure data exchange
in the presence of updates are presented in [7, 35], with the
flow of data (partially) defined in advance. For instance, the
limited scenario of Figure 3(a) could be supported by them.
None of the works above deals with hiding the performed
modifications. Data structures that don’t yield anything
about the history of operations performed on them have
been considered in [30].
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APPENDIX
Signing annotated trees. First, one can view an anno-
tated tree as a collection of edges, i.e., pairs (parent, child).
So, the same signing technique may be used for trees with
homogeneous node types. For trees that mix delete-only
and insert-only nodes, one could separate the delete-only
regions and insert-only ones and sign each separately. A
difficulty is the region frontiers, i.e. those nodes that con-
nect a delete-only region to a insert-only one (parent and
child have different types).
To deal with the above situation, a frontier node will
“carry” the signature for the collection of edges forming the
maximal subtree with the same update type. Hence, we need
to make persistent (as long as the node exists, since it may
be removable) the signing parameters (e.g. the public key)
used for that collection. This means that a frontier node n
will be represented as a pair (n, PKn), and be annotated by
a signature (verifiable by PKn).
Observe that the case of an insert-only region T1 below a
delete-only region T2 needs no specific handling, since the
two regions must have been created by the same peer and
are thus signed by the same secret function (one signature
for each region).
The opposite situation (a delete-only region T1 below an
insert-only region T2) needs more attention. The signing
functions of the two may be different if the root of T1 has
been inserted by a different party than the one who created
the root of T2. When we insert T1, we insert the public-key
of its signature function in the no-remove region, so that it
can’t be removed. We thus guarantee it cannot be removed
unless T2 itself disappears.
Now consider immutable nodes. They can be viewed as
insert-only nodes with an extra attribute that gives the num-
ber of its children, i.e., its cardinality. Since this attribute
cannot be deleted, one cannot change the cardinality. We
conclude the analysis of the four possible types with uncon-
strained nodes. Since they can be modified at will, they are
simply not taken into account when computing signatures.
Finally, consider type changes, from insert-only or delete-
only into immutable. The former case is simple. To change
a insert-only node to immutable, it suffices to insert a cardi-
nality attribute. One cannot use this trick to turn a delete-
only node to immutable, since insertion is not allowed. In
this case, one can prepare this change by including in the
no insert collection, besides usual elements, pairs (node,
cardinality) for all possible cardinalities (there is a limited
number of them for each delete-only node). We can than
remove all but one (corresponding the definitive number of
children) to make the collection immutable. However, by
the above approach, we do not hide the previous type of the
now immutable node.
